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AVIATION LAW: INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRAVEL-A BRIEF DIAGNOSIS AND
PROGNOSIS
JOHN J. KENNELLY*
The law relating to air travel is marked by mystery,
confusion and inconsistency little known in other areas of the
law. Laymen and many lawyers and judges not attuned to the
peculiarities of aviation law would regard as stranger than fiction the inequalities and injustices often found in awards for injury
or death in aviation cases. There are many different laws which
may determine the liability of airlines and aircraft manufacturers, as well as damages obtainable by survivors of air crash victiros. Even though passengers are flying in the same aircraft,
have paid the same fare, and the losses suffered are equal, recoverable damages in the event of a crash may vary enormously.
It is hoped that this article will expose some of the myths and
injustices concerning aviation litigation arising out of international
air travel. To this end, the author will attempt not only to outline
briefly the current state of the law of international air travel, but
also to critically dissect those provisions of this law which are incompatible with fundamental concepts of justice.
I.

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL AND SOME LIMITATIONS

UPON THE RIGHTS OF PASSENGERS

A. The Monetary Limitations

In certain types of international air travel, the Warsaw Con* Attorney at law, Chicago, Illinois; member of the Illinois Bar; Ph.B. and
J.D., Loyola University; Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers; Fellow,
International Academy of Trial Lawyers; Fellow, International Society of Bar-

risters; Member, Inter-American Bar Association.
Shortly before this article went to press, the author completed a trial before
a Chicago, Illinois jury which rendered a unanimous verdict of $5,000,000 for a
single death. The death occurred in domestic air travel. Demonstrative of the
absurdity of treaty-imposed limitations is the fact that if the decedent's ultimate
ticketed destination had been, for example, London, the negligent airline's responsibility might have been limited to only $75,000.
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vention,' Hague Protocol,2 or the Montreal Interim Agreement 8

may limit the liability of an international air carrier for injury
or death.

The Warsaw Convention was initially adoped in Warsaw,
Poland, in 1929, and the United States adhered to it in 1934.4
However, there may be a question whether there ever was legal
This treaty originally
adherence to it by the United States.'
limited damages recoverable from airlines which negligently
caused death or injury during air travel to $8,291.87 (now
about $9,000) where the ticketed nations of origin and destination

were adherents to the treaty.
The Hague Protocol modifies the Warsaw Convention by increasing the maximum liability of airlines to $16,582 for international air travel where the ticketed countries of origin and destination are adherents to the Hague Protocol. 7 The Hague Protocol was not ratified by the United States; however, it may apply
to all passengers regardless of citizenship, since its application del. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, done at Warsaw Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000. T.S. No.
876 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
2. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929,
done at the Hague Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter cited as Hague
Protocol].
3. Agreement C.A.B. 18900, approved C.A.B. Order No. E23680, Docket
17325, May 13, 1966, 44 CAB REP. 819 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Montreal
Interim Agreement].
The Montreal Agreement is a private accord originally involving eleven American and seventeen foreign air carriers. Stephen, The Montreal Conference and
InternationalAviation Liability Limitations, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 557 n.15 (1967),
and now is subscribed to by approximately 100 air carriers. 2 J. KENNELLY, LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES, 117-18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
KENNELLY].

This agreement is not a treaty or agreement between governments, although
C.A.B. approval was required in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1963) which
states:
(a) Every air carrier shall file with the Board . . . every contract or
between such air carrier,
affecting air transportation ...
agreement ...

and any other air carrier, foreign air carrier, or other carrier....
(b) The Board shall by order disapprove any such contract or agreement, .

.

. that it finds to be adverse to the public interest .....

The entire text of the agreement is reprinted in KENNELLY, supra at 111-13.
4. See 49 Stat. 3000 (1934).
5. This issue will be more fully developed infra.
6. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2), 22; KENNELLY, supra
note 3, at 80.
7. Article XI of the Hague Protocol covers the monetary limitations; article
1(2) defines "international carriage" for the purposes of the Warsaw Convention;
see art. XVIII.
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pends solely upon ticketed places of origin and ultimate destination."
The Montreal Interim Agreement modifies the Warsaw Convention by prescribing a $75,000 maximum liability upon airlines,
regardless of fault, whenever the ticketed air travel, otherwise
covered by the Warsaw Convention, provides for a "contact" with
In other words, this Agreement applies
the United States.
whenever any place in the United States constitutes a ticketed
point of origin, ultimate destination or agreed stopping place.
These limitations of monetary liability apply to airlines only.
Manufacturers and other potential defendants are not similarly
insulated." ° Moreover, these treaties, while purporting to apply
only to international air travel, have been held to apply to purely
domestic flights, if the ticketed nations of origin and ultimate
destination are adherents to one of them.''
B.

HypotheticalCases

In July, 1971, ,the Annual Convention of the American Bar
Association was held in London. Approximately 10,000 American
lawyers and judges flew there to attend it. How many of these
lawyers and judges realized that if they were killed during any
portion of their flight to London the recovery of their families
against the airline, even if its negligence were admitted, might
be limited to at most $75,000 per death, regardless of the extent
of provable damages? The following hypothetical cases provide
specific examples of injustices which flow from the application
of this body of law.
Case No. 1. Assume Judge Jones, 40, from Chicago, Illinois,
has a wife and five children, and earns $40,000 per year. He is
killed while flying nonstop from Chicago to London, due to the
admitted negligence of the airline. What remedy against the airline has the family of the wrongfully killed judge? The widow
and children of Judge Jones, by virtue of the Montreal Interim
Agreement might be limited to a maximum recovery of $75,000
8. S. EXEC. H, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. ExEc. REP. No. 3, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
9. Montreal Interim Agreement, note 3, supra; KENNELLY, supra note 3, at
111.
10. See generally Warsaw Convention, note 1, supra; Hague Protocol, note 2,
supra; Montreal Interim Agreement, note 3, supra.

11. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. American Airlines, 43 Misc. 2d
856, 252 N.Y.S.2d 517, (Sup. Ct. 1964). See note 13, infra.
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against the negligent airline, although the provable pecuniary
damages might be more than $1,000,000.12
Case No 2. Assume that Smith, a lawyer from Minneapolis,
Minnesota, with the same income and number of dependents as
Judge Jones obtains a series of tickets from his travel agent to
fly from Minneapolis to Chicago on a domestic Ozark Air Lines
flight. From Chicago he plans to fly to London on BOAC, an
international carrier. While Smith is flying on the domestic
flight from Minneapolis to Chicago, the plane crashes due to the
airline's negligence. Smith survives, but is rendered a quadriplegic, requiring lifelong hospitalization.
What is his remedy
against the admittedly negligent domestic carrier, Ozark Air
Lines? As in the case of Judge Jones, his maximum recovery
against the negligent carrier might be limited to $75,000 by the
Montreal Interim Agreement, even though he was not on a flight
bound for London, his ultimate ticketed destination, but rather
on a purely domestic flight between two states within the United
States.1"
Case No. 3. Suppose Williams, a Chicago lawyer with the
same income and number of dependents as Jones and Smith, flies
safely to London, but then decides to fly from London to Rome.
While in Rome, Williams purchases a new ticket to fly to Athens.
Williams is killed due to the airline's negligence while enroute from
Rome to Athens on board an Alitalia Airlines plane. What
are the rights of his widow and five children against Alitalia Airlines? The family of Williams could be limited to a maximum
recovery of approximately $16,600 from the negligent airline by
the terms of The Hague Protocol. 4
The provision of this Protocol which limits the recovery of
Williams' survivors is indefensible. Most people who fly to Europe
visit various countries, just as foreign travelers who visit the
United States generally do not confine their visits to a single
state. Few American travelers are familiar with the pitfalls
12. Montreal Interim Agreement, note 3, supra.
13. Id. Felsenfeld v. Societie Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerlenne, 8 Av. L. REP.
17,199 (N.Y. City Ct. 1962); Grein v. Imperial
Airways, Ltd., [1935] 53 K.B. 51 [reproduced in [1936] U.S. Av. 184-250].
Even though the Minneapolis to Chicago flight is purely domestic, Smith's
ultimate ticketed destination is foreign. The Minneapolis to Chicago leg of the
journey is "International Transportation" as defined in the Warsaw Convention,
article 1(2)-(3); KENNELLY, supra note 3, at 80.
14. See note 7, supra.
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which exist for their families if they purchase new tickets while
in Europe and are killed while on flights between European
countries. Not only are recoverable damages against negligent
airlines severely restricted, either to approximately $9,000 or
$16,600,15 but there is also the possibility of uncollectable airtrip
insurance policies which travelers purchase at airports before
1
their departure. 6
In Williams' case it must be noted that while in Rome he
decided to fly on Alitalia Airlines only to Athens. Williams' new
ticket, acquired in Rome for his Rome to Athens trip, would not
have involved a "contact" with the United States, and thus, his
trip would not have come within the purview of the Montreal
Interim Agreement. Consequently, since Italy and Greece are
adherents to the Hague Protocol,' 7 his family's recovery would
be limited by its provisions to $16,600.
Case No. 4. Suppose Williams' partner, Brown, also from
Chicago and with the same earnings and number of dependents,
decides while in London to fly to Rome. In Rome he decides
to fly with Williams on the Alitalia Airlines flight to Athens. At
the same time, he obtains a ticket for a further flight to
Iran on Iranian Airlines. Brown is killed with Williams during the Rome to Athens flight. What are the rights of Brown's
survivors against the negligent Alitalia Airlines?
Unlike Williams' family in the preceding case, Brown's family would not be limited to $16,600 by the Hague Protocol because
fortuitously and illogically, Brown's final ticketed destination
was Iran. Iran is not a signatory to either the Hague Protocol
or the Warsaw Convention.' 8 Thus, no treaty would apply to
Brown's family; they could recover all provable damages without
any arbitrary treaty-imposed limitation. Contrary to the Williams death case, suit could be filed by Brown's estate against
Alitalia Airlines anywhere in the United States where Alitalia
15. The $9000 figure applies to nations which are adherents to the Warsaw
Convention only. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22. The $16,600 figure
applies to adherents of the Hague Protocol. Hague Protocol, supra note 2, art. XI.
In either case these limitations apply only where the ticketed nation of origin or

ultimate destination is an adherent to one or both of the treaties. See Warsaw
Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2)-(3); Hague Protocol, supra note 2, art. XVIII.

16. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 428 F.2d 499
(7th Cir. 1970).
17. See 478 U.N.T.S. 373, 401.

18. See DEP'T

OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE
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Airlines has "minimum contacts."' 19
The choice of forum could be significant if the crash occurred
on land.2" If suit were filed in Illinois, Brown's estate could elect
to base the action upon the Illinois Wrongful Death Act."
If
the death occurred on the "high seas" and if, for example, Brown
had been flying on an American carrier's aircraft, instead of Alitalia Airlines, his estate's remedy could be based upon the federal
Death on the High Seas Act, 2 and suit could be filed in either

state or federal court.23
19. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Federal
Insurance Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 341 F. Supp. 855 (W.D.N.C. 1972), af'd
473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973). The United States Courts have jurisdiction over
foreign air lines which have "minimum contacts" within the United States. Scott v.
Middle East Airlines Co., 240 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Benjamin v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 12 Av. L. REP.
17,286 (N.D. Ill. 1971), wherein
tickets for the defendant airline were available only through other air lines'
independent ticket agents by means of inter-line agreements. The court held
that sufficient minimum contacts existed, even though defendant had no offices or
employees in the forum state.
For application of the minimum contacts doctrine to typical long-arm statutes,
see Cook Associates, Inc. v. Colonial Broach and Machine Co., 14 Ill. App. 3d
965, 304 N.E.2d 27 (1973); Colony Press, Inc. v. M.J. Fleeman, 17 InI. App. 3d
14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1974). Both cases illustrate application of ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, 1 17 (1973).
20. Choice of forum would be important in determining provable damages.
Only two states still retain a specific dollar limitation on wrongful death actions:
Kansas, $50,000 (K.S.A. 60-1903 (Cum. Supp. 1973)); West Virginia, $110,000
(15 W.Va. Code Ann. § 55-7-6 (Cum. Sup. 1973)). However, the criteria for
assessing damages are far from uniform. For example, in Compania Dominicana
de Aviacion v. Knapp, 251 So. 2d 18 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971), a judgment of
$1,800,000 was affirmed in the death of a 16-year old boy. Had this same action
been brought under the laws of the state of Maine, damages would have been
limited to a mere $10,000. The Maine death statute, 18 M.R.S.A. § 2552 (Cum.
Supp. 1975), restricts damages for the death of an unemancipated child to
$10,000.
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 20 §§ 1-2 (1973). See Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d
42. 262, N.E.2d 593 (1970).
22. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970).
23. Cf. McGovern v. Philadelphia and Reading Co., 235 U.S. 389 (1914).
An alien killed on an American aircraft which crashes on the high seas is entitled
to the protection of the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970).
Following equal protection principles espoused in McGovern, the family of a
foreigner wrongfully killed on the high seas while a passenger of an American air
carrier should get the benefits of the statute. Suit may be instituted in either state
or federal court. Field, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, A Summary of American
Law Institute Proposals, 46 F.R.D. 141 (1969); Currie, The Federal Courts and
the American Law Institute, Part 1, 36 U.CHi. L. REV. 1 (1968), and Part II, 36
U. CHI. L. REv. 268 (1969); Ledet v. United Aircraft Corp., 10 N.Y.2d 258, 176
N.E.2d 820, 219 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1961); Leroy v. United Air Lines, Inc., 11
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By contrast, in an action filed by Williams' survivors in Illinois, Alitalia Airlines would contend that suit could not be properly filed anywhere in the United States because of the restrictive venue provisions of the Hague Protocol,2 4 and that suit
would have to be instituted by Williams' estate in Italy or Greece.
Additionally, if Williams' estate alleged wilful misconduct of the
airline or inadequate warnings on the ticket and that therefore
the limited damages provision of $16,600 should not apply,2 5
Alitalia Airlines would make a motion to dismiss for lack of juris26
diction.
These examples demonstrate only a few of the indefensible
injustices and incongruities which now exist in respect to international aviation law. Illustrations of other such absurdities are
almost endless. One final hypothetical case in this vein will be
posed.
Case No. 5. Suppose that a sheik from Iran, having a multimillion-dollar yearly income is enroute from New York to Tehran
via London, and an American girl is aboard the same TWA jetliner. She is ticketed to fly from New York to London to visit a relative and then to return to New York. The TWA aircraft crashes
in the Atlantic Ocean, due to the negligence of TWA. The sheik
is killed and the American child is permanently paralyzed and
blinded.
What are the rights of the sheik's estate in contrast to the
rights of the girl against the admittedly negligent airline? The
Warsaw Convention is not applicable to the claim of the sheik's
estate against TWA because his ultimate ticketed destination was
Iran, a non-adherent to the Warsaw Convention. The criterion for
damages regarding the claim of the sheik's estate would be the
Death on the High Seas Act, 2 7 because his death occurred on the
Av. L. REP.

17,919 (Cir. Ct., Cook Co., Ill. 1970).

Cf. M. NoRRis,

THE

LAW OF SEAMEN 775 (2d ed. 1970); Note, Admiralty: Death on the High Seas by

Wrongful Act; Concurrent Jurisdictionof State Courts, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 632, 637
(1962).
24. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28. The venue limitations in
this article apply as well to the Hague Protocol. See Hague Protocol, supra note 2,
art. XIX.
25. These issues will be treated more fully infra.
26. See, e.g., Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798 (2d
Cir. 1971); Pardonnet v. Flying Tiger Air Line, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 683 (N.D.
Ill. 1964); Pitman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 887 (E.D.
Pa. 1963); Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).

27. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970).
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high seas while he was aboard a United States air carrier. His fam28
ily would probably be able to recover many millions of dollars.
By contrast, the paralyzed and blinded American child would
be limited to a mere $75,000 against TWA despite her need for
permanent hospitalization and care, not to speak of a lifetime of
disability and pain. How can this possibly be equated with anyone's concept of justice?
Theoretically, the Warsaw Convention, almost half a century
old, and the Hague Protocol, more than twenty years old, are intended to bind the more than two billion inhabitants in the world
and their heirs who become fare-paying passengers on any carrier or charter aircraft if the passenger's ticketed nations of origin and ultimate destination are adherents to either or both treaties on the date of the accident. It makes no difference that the
nation of the passenger's citizenship is not an adherent. 29
Another factor to consider is that on most tickets the required warnings are printed in English. Efforts are made by
some airlines to print tickets which have warnings in the language of the flag carrier. However, this hardly supplies a solution because many travelers are children or illiterate adults.
Moreover, the passengers speak hundreds of languages. Yet they
are presumed to be able to read and understand the warnings
on their tickets which even for an English-speaking lawyer are
almost unintelligible. All passengers-babies, blind people, and illiterates-are theoretically bound by the restrictive warnings on
the tickets concerning the venue and damage limitations.
C.

Additional Limitationsand Issues

Because of limitations of space, several other problems inherent in this type of litigation will be alluded to, but not completely
28. Although originally it was assumed that article 17 did not create a cause
of action, there is authority that the Convention, per se, creates a cause of action.
See generally briefs filed by amici curiae in Lisi v. Alitalia Airlines, 390 U.S. 455

(1968). Intervening amicus curiae, the United Kingdom, took the position that the
effect of the Lisi decision would be to remove the restriction on liability if the
Warsaw Convention limitation provisions were held not to apply because of wilful

misconduct, non-delivery of tickets, or inadequacy of tickets. See Brief for United
Kingdom as Amicus Curiae at 8, Lisi v. Alitalia Airlines 390 U.S. 455 (1968);
Petition for Certiorari to the 2d Cir. at 8, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966);
Tompkins, Limitation of Liability by Treaty and Statute, 36 J. Am L. & COM. 421

(1970).
29. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2); KENNELLY, supra note 3, at

80-81; Hague Protocol, supra note 2, art. 1(2), XVIII.
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analyzed. Where can suit be brought? Both the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol severely restrict the rights of
the passenger or his estate. Suit may be brought only in the
territory of one of the "High Contracting Parties," or in a court
of the domicile of the carrier or of its principal place of business,
or where it has a place of business through which the contract
has been made, or at the place of destination. 0 Thus, if an
American citizen purchases a ticket in Rome to fly Alitalia Airlines from Rome to Athens and is killed on the trip, the airline
would contend that his family could not bring suit in the United
States.
What law applies regarding discovery and requisite proof of
liability? In 1944, a treaty was adopted which deals with preservation of wreckage, participation by government investigators
from the nation of the aircraft's manufacture, and other aspects
of accident investigation. 31 The implementation of this treaty
is not easy if, for example, litigation of a Moscow Airport crash
2
is involved.
What is the measure of damages if one of these treaties is
applicable but the damage limitation provisions in a particular
case can be avoided by proof of wilful misconduct of the air carrier or inadequacy of the warning on the ticket? The law of the
United States in respect to the warning requirements of the Warsaw Convention is a plethora of confusion and contradiction, and
contains far too many uncertainties and pitfalls to be easily and
uniformly applied.33 It is too much to expect a half-century old
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28.
Convention on International Civil Aviation, open for signature Dec. 22,
Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591. See art. 26 of this Convention.
The U.S.S.R. is an adherent to this treaty. See DEP'T OF STATE,
TREATIES IN FORCE 304 (1974).
33. The following cases uphold the sufficiency of ticket warnings: American
Smelting and Refining Co. v. Phillipine Air Lines, Inc., 4 Av. L. REP. %17,413
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), aII'd, 285 App. Div. 1119, 141 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1954),
aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 866, 136 N.E.2d 14, 153 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1956); Kraus v. K.L.M.
Royal Dutch Air Lines, 92 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup, Ct. 1949); Ross v. Pan American
Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949), cert. denied, Froman v. Pan
American Airways, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
Compare the above to cases finding ticket warnings insufficient: Eck v.
United Arab Airlines Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249
(1964); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494
(9th Cir. 1965); Lisi v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 253 F. Supp. 237
30.
31.
1944, 61
32.
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treaty, conceived in an entirely different era, to work in view of
the burgeoning population of this planet and the vast increase
in international air travel. How can anything be more absurd
than to hand a ticket printed in English to a citizen of Mozambique who speaks only Swahili, and then limit his damages to
$9,000 because he could or should have read and understood the
warnings?
II.

THE WARSAW CONVENTION

In 1934, the State Department transmitted its approval of the
Warsaw Treaty to the President; the President submitted the Treaty
to the Senate. On June 15, 1934, without debate, committee hearing, or report, the Senate gave its advice and consent by voice
vote. 4 The United States deposited an instrument of adherence
on July 31, 1934, and the President proclaimed the Treaty ninety
days later. 5 Thus, although the United States had nothing to
do with the formulation of the Convention and had "adhered"
rather than "ratified," it was almost a charter member.
A.

An Example of the Incongruity of the
Warsaw Convention

This author has been appointed by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, in connection with
litigation pending there regarding the 1974 DC-10 Turkish Airlines crash at Orly Airport, Paris,8 6 to brief the issue of whether
the Warsaw Treaty actually became a treaty of the United States
and, if so, whether its venue and damage limitation provisions
are unconstitutional.
There is nothing complicated about the facts relating to this,
the worst of all aircraft disasters. A cargo door on the aircraft
opened causing decompression, loss of control and the aircraft's
crash which killed 334 passengers. The passengers were from
twenty different countries; some were illiterate; they spoke many
different languages.
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) af 'd by an equally divided court, sub nom. Alitalia Linee v.
Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968), reh. denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968).
34. 78 CONG. REC. 11,582 (1934).
35. See 49 Stat. 3000 (1934). See also Address by John J. Kennelly at

Southern Methodist University Air Law Symposium, Mar. 18, 1971.
36. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, MDL No. 172 (pending C.D.

Cal.).
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Although the manufacturer, McDonnell-Douglas, had prescribed specific safety modifications for the cargo door, it had not
installed them on the aircraft by the time of the mishap.
Counsel for most of the litigants will undoubtedly focus their
attacks upon McDonnell-Douglas because under the Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol the manufacturer is not
granted any insulation either as to place of suit or extent of liability for full provable damages. The theory of recovery in all
these cases has been negligence and strict liability. In some cases
the United States is being sued for alleged negligent certification.
But what of Turkish Airlines? A great many other DC-10s,
which did not have the cargo door safety modifications have safely
flown trillions of miles. Turkish Airlines had apparently entrusted the closing and locking of the door to an inexperienced
Paris airport employee. The airline, of course, had a non-delegable duty to see that its aircraft was airworthy and that the cargo
door was properly closed and locked. 37
Assuming that a jury were to find Turkish Airlines negligent
but not guilty of wilful misconduct, it would seem strange to McDonnell-Douglas stockholders and American taxpayers that the
manufacturer and United States Government may be liable in
a United States court for full unlimited damages to estates of foreign citizens who were killed on a foreign air carrier's aircraft
in a foreign country. The foreign carrier may escape with only
minimal payments.38
Furthermore, if the California federal district court applies
California law to the rights of the airline and McDonnell-Douglas, vis-d-vis each other, Turkish Airlines could recover from
37. DeVito v. United Airlines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). See also
8 AM. JUR. 2d Aviation § 68; cf. Koenig v. 399 Corporation, 97 Ill. App. 2d 345,
240 N.E.2d 164 (1968); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 46 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965); Booth Steamship Co. v. Meier & Oclhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.
1958); Curtis v. Rochester & Syracuse Railroad Co., 18 N.Y. 534 (1859).
38. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22 (1)-(4); KENNELLY, supra
note 3, at 88-89.
Thus, if a claim on behalf of one passenger's estate was adjudicated to be
worth $2,000,000, and assuming that the Warsaw Convention applies to such case,
and that the carrier, manufacturer and the United States Government are held
liable, the following sums would be paid:
(a) Turkish Airlines
$
9,000.00
(b) United States (taxpayers)
$ 995,500.00
(c)

McDonnell-Douglas

$ 995,500.00

Total
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the manufacturer all payments it made for passenger claims,
even if the manufacturer were held not negligent, but liable on
the basis of strict liability. '" Such liability may be imposed although the manufacturer exercised reasonable care.40
The facts of the Paris Airport disaster are remarkably simple
and basically indisputable, yet resolving each separate claim will
be like attempting to tattoo soap bubbles. For example, does the
doctrine of strict liability apply to McDonnell-Douglas? Which
jurisdiction's law applies to passengers' claims to which neither
the Warsaw Convention nor the Hague Protocol applies because
passengers' tickets specified their places of origin as non-signatory countries? What law of damages applies to the cases in
which treaty limitations might be held applicable except that
tickets did not contain suitable warnings? May a federal court
deny counsel his right to separately try his own case?
B.

Did the United States Ever Adhere
to the Warsaw Convention?

Not relevant to all the Turkish Airline cases, but relevant to
cases involving American passengers, is the issue of whether the
Warsaw Convention was ever legally adhered to by the United
States. A close examination of the mechanics relating to the alleged accession demonstrates that there is a serious question whether it was legally ratified by the United States as required by
the United States Constitution. 4 '
All international undertakings of the President are not
"treaties" within the meaning of article II, section 2 of the Constitution.4 2 In 1965 the President unilaterally stated that he
would "denounce" the Warsaw Convention, thereby taking the
position that he had the power to denounce the treaty without
the advice and consent of the Senate. The power of treaty
termination is not expressly granted -to any branch of the government. The Constitution provides only that, "He [the Presi39. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d
142, 116 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1974); Ruiz v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 463, 93 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1971); Lewis v. American Hoist &
Derrick Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 570, 97 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1971).
40. But cf. Lindsay v. McDonnell-Douglas, 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972).
41. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
42. Starkist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 268 (Ct. Cl. 1958),
aff'd, 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
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dent] shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators

present concur; . . ."-4 The power of termination, denunciation
or abrogation has generally been viewed as necessarily implicit
4
in the power to "make" treaties.

It is less clear whether this implied power of termination
rests exclusively with the President, or must be exercised in accordance with congressional authorization 5 or with advice and

consent of the Senate.46
The contention has been made, but not yet resolved, that the
Warsaw Convention constituted, on behalf of the United States, a

mere declaration of policy. The Convention was "signed at Warsaw by the respective Plenipotentiaries of certain countries ... and
left open for signature until January 31, 1930. . . ." However, the
United States never signed it.4 8 The question whether the Warsaw
Convention is a "treaty," and if so, whether it is constitutional, will
probably reach the United States Supreme Court in the Turkish
Airlines litigation or in cases with similar issues arising out of recent international air crashes at Pago Pago, 49 Moscow, 0 New Del43. U.S.

CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
44. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821); Techt v. Hughes,
229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920); Taft, The
Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative and Judicial Branches of
Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599 (1916); S. CRANDALL, TREATIES-THEIR MAKING
AND ENFORCEMENT 461 (2d ed. 1916); W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 561 (2d ed. 1929); Q. WRIGIT, THE CONTROL
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

(1922).

45. Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., Ltd., 297 U.S. 114 (1936).
46. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 42325 (1952); Nelson, The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the
United States: Theory and Practice, 42 MINN. L. REV. 879 (1958); Riesenfeld,
The Power of Congress and the President in International Relations: Three
Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 643 (1937); 5 G.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

319-42 (1943); Reeves, The Jones

Act and the Denunciation of Treaties, 15 AM. J.
47. 49 Stat. 3000 (1934).

INT'L

48. See generally 49 Stat. 3000 (1934);

L. 33 (1921).

DEP'T OF STATE,

TREATIES IN

FORCE 302 (1974).
49. In re Air Crash Disaster, Pago Pago, American Samoa, Jan. 30, 1974,
MDL No.176 (pending C.D.Cal.).
50. Gerbic v. Japan Air Lines, No. 73 L 1767 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Ill.,
filed
Feb. 5, 1973); Rodriguez v. Japan Air Lines, No. 73 L 8951 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co.,
Ill.,
filed June 13, 1973); Sackheim v. Japan Air Lines, No.72 L 16885, (Cir. Ct.
Cook Co., Ill., filed Dec. 14, 1972).
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hi, 51 and London,52 which caused the deaths of a great number
of American passengers. American courts have heretofore assumed that the treaty was legally adhered to by the United
States because until recently the validity of the method of adherence was never questioned. Not until 1967 was the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention attacked on a denial of due
process theory. 55
C.

The Constitutionalityof the Warsaw Convention's
Venue and Damage Limitations
Assuming that the Warsaw Convention did become a treaty
of the United States, the determination of the constitutionality
of the venue and damage limitation provisions requires an inquiry into its history. In critically evaluating the seemingly precipitate action of the Senate, it must be remembered that in 1934
economic conditions throughout the world were disastrous.
There was no capital for prudent investment and certainly little
or none for fledgling international air carriers.
There was
scant international air transportation at that time, and the very
few airlines which engaged in such transportation flew in four
and six-passenger planes on short European trips, such as from
The Hague to Paris. The accident rate at that time was eighty
times greater than at present.5 4 Any justifications for extending preferential treatment to international airlines have long disappeared, if indeed the aforementioned conditions provided any.
At the present time, the validity of the damage and venue
provisions of the Warsaw Convention has not been ruled on by
any federal or state court of appellate jurisdiction. However, an
Illinois trial court has done so in Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines.5 5
That case involved the death of an Illinois citizen, Burdell,
who was temporarily living in Singapore with his family where
51. Marquadt v. Japan Air Lines, No. 73 L 6103 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Ill.,
filed Apr. 24, 1973); Weatherly v. Japan Air Lines, No. 72 L 9265 (Cir. Ct. Cook
Co., Ill., filed July 18, 1972).
52. Sabini v. British European Airways Corp., No. 72 L 14039 (Cir. Ct.
Cook Co., Ill., filed Oct. 20, 1972); Clarizio v. British European Airways Corp.,
No. 73 L 5997 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Ill., filed Apr. 23, 1973).
53. See KENNELLY, supra note 3, at 25-40.

54. Kennelly, The Warsaw Convention Treaty, 13

TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE

35, 39 (1969).

55. 10 Av. L. REP.

18,151 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Ill. 1968); 11 Av. L. REP.

117,351 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Il. 1969).
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he was employed in a branch of an Illinois company. Burdell
was ticketed to fly on various airlines from Singapore to Bangkok
to Hong Kong and then Tokyo. Burdell's Canadian Pacific Airlines jetliner crashed while attempting to land at Tokyo International Airport. Burdell left surviving his widow and three
children.
The airline contended that suit could not be brought in Illinois, although Canadian Pacific Airlines unquestionably was engaged in business in Illinois. The airline asserted that suit had
to be brought in Singapore, Hong Kong, or Tokyo because of the
venue provisions of the Warsaw Convention. It further contended that, in any event, the family of Burdell was limited to
a maximum recovery of $8,291 because of the Convention. Both
the plaintiff's and the airline's attorneys had requested that the
court rule upon all issues, including the constitutionality of the
damage and venue provisions of the Convention.
The court ruled that the venue and damage limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention were unconstitutional.5 6 The
court also held that, apart from its unconstitutionality, the Warsaw Treaty limitation did not apply to the case because the tickets
supplied to Burdell had not contained adequate warnings of damage and venue limitations and also because the ticketed country
of origin of the air trip was Singapore. Malaysia had previously
adhered to the Convention, but Singapore, a new city-state which
succeeded Malaysia, had not deposited any instruments of adherence. The court ruled that Singapore was not bound by its predecessor sovereign's adherence. 7
56. Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 10 Av. L. REP.
Ct. Cook Co., Il.

18,158-60 (Cir.

1968).

57. Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 11 Av. L. REP.

17,354 (Cir. Ct.

Cook Co., Ill. 1969).

Article 38(2) of the Warsaw Convention provides that adherence shall be
effected only by "a notification address to the Government of the Republic of

Poland, which shall inform the Government of each of the High Contracting
Parties thereof." The mere fact that a precedent sovereign of a developing nation
may have acceded to the Warsaw Convention does not automatically mean that
the new sovereign automatically did. O'Connell, Independence and Succession to
Treaties, 38 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 84 (1962); Jones, State Succession in the Matter
of Treaties, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 360 (1947).

In any case in which the ticketed nations of origin or destination are claimed
by the airline to have been signatories, it may be important to make further
inquiry directly to the appropriate authorities in Warsaw, Poland, where declara-

tions of adherence are classified and stored. Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines,

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1975

15

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1975], Art. 4
INTERNATIONAL

AIR

TRAVEL

In Burdell, the court also ruled that the treaty's preferential
treatment of airlines discriminated against passengers, aircraft
manufacturers and the United States government, all of whom
might be held liable in any number of cases. "8 The manufacturer might be liable if the aircraft did not meet prescribed strict
liability standards or if it had been negligently designed or manufactured; "a the United States government might be liable if it
had negligently certified the plane or committed air traffic control errors.6 0 Thus, if a verdict had been rendered in Burdell
in the exact amount of the subsequent settlement, and if the
manufacturer, McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Company, had been
held liable along with the airline, the manufacturer would have
had to pay all sums in excess of the $8,291 Convention limitation,
whereas the much more negligent airline would have had to pay
only $8,291.
After the opinion was published, the airline requested the
court to withdraw its ruling concerning unconstitutionality because
of the court's ruling that the ticketed nation of origin, Singapore,
had not legally adhered to the treaty. The court granted the airline's motion, stating, however, that it was still persuaded that the
Warsaw Convention damage and venue limitation provisions were
unconstitutional. 61 Neither ruling was appealed by the airline,
and the case was settled for about twenty-five times the then existing Warsaw Convention limit of $8,291.
This decision, although that of a trial court, has received national recognition and approval by constitutional scholars. It is
of considerable significance in light of two recent decisions, one
from the Supreme Court, Moragne v. States Marine Lines,62 the
other from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Hornsby v. The
Fish Meal Co. 63 The holdings in Moragne and Hornsby eradicate
10 Av. L

REP.

18,151 (Cir. Ct., Cook Co., Il1. 1968); 11 Av. L.

REP.

T 17,351 (Cir. Ct., Cook Co., Il1. 1969).

58. See note 65, infra.
59. Kennelly, Aviation Accidents-Liability of Manufacturers, 18

TRAL

LAWYER'S GUIDE 158 (1974).

60. Rapp v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967); see
Kennelly, Claims and Suits for Aviation Accidents Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 16 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 1 (1972).
61. Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 11 Av. L. REP.
17,354 (Cir. Ct.
Cook Co., Ill. 1969).
62. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
63. 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970).
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any constitutional basis for statutes or treaties which deny fair recovery for the wrongful killing of a human being.
Professor Arthur John Keefe, in commenting on the Burdell
decision, said:
It is a dreadful thing to have to say, but, in truth, decisions
such as Kilberg, Pearson, Long and Scott lack the simplicity
and honesty of Judge Bua's ruling in Burdell. Here at last is
a Judge who faces up to the real problem, the constitution64
ality of outrageous, discriminatory, out-of-date, rotten laws.
In plain words, the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol grant enormous preferential treatment with respect to liability for damages for negligence in international air transportation
to airlines only. The more than 30,000 aircraft and component
part manufacturers, the more than 1,000,000 private aircraft owners and operators, the United States government and all other potential defendants are exposed to unlimited liability. The Burdell
opinion refers to the absurdity of this preferential treatment as
applied to that case.,'
It would seem that the time has come for the courts to once
and for all judicially terminate the life of a forty-year-old treaty
which is morally, economically and constitutionally indefensible,
not only from the standpoint of passengers and their families, but
also because of the obvious discrimination against manufacturers,
64. Keef, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson and "The" True
National Common Cause, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 316, 356 (1969).
65. Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 10 Av. L. REP.
18,151, 161 (Cir.
Ct. Cook Co., Ill. 1968). This court stated:
The Court finds that such provisions are arbitrary, irresponsible, capricious and indefensible as applied to this case, in that such provisions
would attempt to impose a damage limitation of considerably less than
the undisputed pecuniary losses and damages involved in this case. Such
unjustifiable, preferential treatment of airlines is unconstitutional. The
Court finds that such preferential discrimination to airlines does not apply to manufacturers or even to the United States Government. As
pointed out by the plaintiffs, this could result in an absurd situation in
which, in this case, Douglas Aircraft Company, if liable under either the
strict liability rule or because of common law negligence, might be required to pay damages of $591,700, if a verdict of a jury were $600,000.
Canadian Pacific Airlines, which might be considered much more negligent and at fault than this defendant manufacturer, would be permitted
to escape with the nominal payment of approximately $8,300. The Government enjoys no immunity or restriction of liability. Thus, in a similar situation involving the Government as an additional defendant, the
United States Government would be required to pay damages similar,
comparatively to that of the manufacturer. The Court considers that
there is no basis for this unequal and discriminatory treatment of common carrier airlines, engaged in international travel, and that there is
no legal or rational basis for this discriminatory treatment.
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those connected with the aircraft industry and taxpayers of the
United States.
III.

THE HAGUE PROTOCOL

In 1955, certain nations which had adhered to the Warsaw
Convention became dissatisfied with its arbitrary damage limitations.66 As a result, a treaty was formulated at The Hague which
became effective in 1963 for the particular nations which ratified
it. However, the United States never ratified the Hague Protocol
because the increase in the monetary limitation was so nominal.6 7
The Hague Protocol increases the Warsaw Convention damage limitation from the sum of $8,291 to a mere $16,582.8 Although the United States has not ratified the Hague Protocol, it
still applies to United States citizens since the criterion is not citizenship, but ticketed points of origin and ultimate destination. 69
IV.

METHODS OF AVOIDING LIMITING PROVISIONS OF THE

WARSAW CONVENTION
There are three ways to avoid the Warsaw Convention damages limitation provisions, apart from its alleged unconstitutionality: 1. Prove that the air carrier was guilty of wilful misconduct.7"
2. Prove that tickets were not delivered to the passengers. 71 3.
Prove that tickets delivered to the passengers did not contain adequate warnings of Warsaw Convention limitations.72
A.

Wilful Misconduct

The original Warsaw Convention was written in French.
The French wording of article 2573 has been translated to mean
66. 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 552 (1968).
67. S. EXEC. H, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
68. See text and note 7, supra. 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw

589 (1968).
69. Hague Protocol, supra note 2, art. XVIII.

70. Sand, Air Carrier'sLimitation of Liability and Air Passenger'sAccident
Compensation Under the Warsaw Convention, 28 J. AnR L. & COM. 260 (1962);
KLM v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
71. Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 816 (1965); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965);
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.
72. Lisi v. Alitalia Airlines, 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 370
F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
73. [Q]ui excluent ou limitent sa responsabilit6 si le dommage provient
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There is considerable doubt, however,

whether the usually accepted translation is accurate. Some students of the French language believe that these words mean gross
negligence or bad conduct. In any event, even wilful and
wanton misconduct, which is generally defined as a higher degree
of wrong than mere negligence or gross negligence,7 5 does not
require an actual intent to harm, but only a disregard of probable
consequences. 76 Realization of a one percent chance that an aircraft will crash as a result of a certain act or omission is sufficient
to make the carrier's conduct "wilful misconduct" in the sense of
77
article 25.
Dean Prosser recognized that "wilfull misconduct" has been
the subject of varying definitions. 78 The lack of a universal definition or standard makes wilful misconduct susceptible to the "oh
my God" type of reasoning. If the judge or jury, while listening to a witness recount the facts of an accident, find themselves
saying "oh my God, you didn't," then the conduct is wilful and
wanton. 79 There are various definitions of the French terms but
in substance they involve a disregard of consequences which will
lead to obvious danger.80
de son dol ou d'une faute qui, d'apr~s la loi du tribunal saisi, est consideree comme 6quivalente au dol.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1), at 3006.
74. Actually the original French text did not employ the language synonomous with "wilful misconduct." However, the English text of the Warsaw Convention contains those words, and most courts have employed this translation,
although inaccurate. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1), at 3020. See
Kennelly, Anomalies in the Present Law Concerning Aviation Disasters and
Comments Regarding the Proposed Guatemalan Protocol, 15 TRIAL LAWYER'S
GUIDE 116 (1971).
75. Carden v. Evans, 243 Ark. 233, 419 S.W.2d 295 (1967); Stevens v.
Murphy, 69 Wash. 2d 939, 421 P.2d 668 (1966); Sheldon v. City of Burlingame,
146 Cal. App. 2d 30, 303 P.2d 344 (1956); McCarthy's Case, 314 Mass. 610, 51
N.E.2d 113 (1943); Meek v. Fowler, 3 Cal. 2d 420, 45 P.2d 194 (1935).
76. Jarvis v. Herrin City Park District, 6 Ill. App. 3d 516, 285 N.E.2d 564
(1972); Fuller v. Chambers, 142 Cal. App. 2d 377, 298 P.2d 125 (1956); Grey v.
American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955); Schulz v. Fible, 71 Ohio App.
353, 48 N.E.2d 899 (1943); Browne v. Fernandez, 140 Cal. App. 689, 36 P.2d 122
(1934); Meyer v. Hart, 110 Conn. 244, 147 A. 678 (1929).
77. H. DRION, LIMrrATIoN OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 233

(1954).
78.
79.
conduct,
80.

W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 150-52 (2d ed. 1955).
Burrell, A New Approach to the Problem of Willful and Wanton Mis[1949] INs. L. J. 716, 723.
KLM v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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B.

Delivery of Tickets to Passengers8 '

Situations sometimes occur where tickets are not delivered
to passengers, or where delivery takes place after the passenger
is aboard the aircraft. In Warren v. Flying Tiger Line,82 the
passengers were given "boarding tickets" or "passes" at the foot
of the ramp leading to the aircraft. The court in that case ruled
that the delivery was not made sufficiently in advance so that
passengers would have ample opportunity to take self-protective
measures. These measures could include purchasing insurance
or electing not to take the trip at all, in light of the restrictive
damage provisions. The carrier was barred by article 3 (2) from
availing itself of the Convention's liability limitations.8"
Non-delivery of tickets may also occur in respect to servicemen who are flying on military-chartered airlines. In such cases,
servicemen usually only receive boarding passes. Also, regular
fare passengers flying in group tours often are not issued tickets
84
because the travel directors handle all ticketing.
C.

Inadequate Warning on Tickets

In Lisi v. Alitalia Airlines8 5 the court held that the notice
requirements of the Warsaw Convention were not met by language on an airline ticket which was "ineffectively positioned,
diminutively sized, and unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting color, or anything else."'86 The Second Circuit Court of Ap81. Article 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention provides that the carrier must
deliver a passenger's ticket and that:
[I]f the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having
been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of the convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at 3015.
82. 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
83. See note 77, supra.
84. In litigation growing out of the 1966 jetliner crash at Mt. Fuji, Japan,
proof was made that 56 of the deceased passengers were flying as part of a tour.
They never actually received tickets, and for this and other reasons the Warsaw
Convention damage limitations were not applicable. See generally Brief for Plaintiff at 31-32, Vanderwall v. British Overseas Airways Corp., No. 66 L 4429 (Cir.
Ct. Cook Co., Ill. 1968) [copy on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
85. 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), a/I'd, 307 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966),
a/i'd, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
86. Millikin Trust v. Iberia Lineas Aeras de Espafia, S.A., 11 Av. L. REP.
17,331 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co., N.Y. 1969).
The Civil Aeronautics Board did not profess to be codifying or in any way
determining what size type or warning is required by the Warsaw Convention.
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peals concurred with this finding, and added that "even if a
passenger were able to read the printing on the ticket and baggage
check, it is highly questionable whether he would be able to
understand the meaning of the language contained thereon.""7
The airlines are now attempting to pull themselves up by their
own bootstraps by "agreeing upon" a new form of ticket.8 8
D.

Foresightand Knowledge

There may be a fourth and even more effective means of
avoiding the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention.
Armed with correct information, a sophisticated air traveler making an international flight can buy a ticket which has as its final
destination any nonsignatory nation, and thus escape all limitations. Such a traveler can easily obtain a refund for the unused
final portion of his ticket. Unsophisticated air travelers, however,
are severely penalized by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol.

V.

THE MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT

The Warsaw Convention provides that a higher liability figure with respect to the transportation of passengers may be agreed
to by the carrier.8 9 Approximately fifty years have elapsed since
the Warsaw Convention was drafted, during which time the airlines have grown from fledgling companies to giants. Yet not until
1966 did a single international air carrier see fit to raise the limitation even though the treaty contains explicit provisions authorizing
airlines to do so.
After almost thirty years of purported adherence to the Warsaw Convention, and after the death of Senator Capehart's son
during an international flight, many members of the Senate finally
became aware of the indefensibility of the damage limitations it
imposes. 90 These senators threatened to denounce the treaty.
Regardless of the Montreal Agreement, this author believes that the court may not

declare the ticket sufficient as a matter of law. The court and jury must determine
as a factual issue whether the tickets fulfilled the requirements of article 3 of the

Convention as defined in Lisi with respect to size of print, color contrast, clarity
and so forth.

87. Lisi v. Alitalia Airlines, 370 F.2d 508, 514 n.10 (2d Cir. 1966).
88. See Montreal Interim Agreement, note 3, supra.
89. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(1).
90. The airline attempted to limit the recovery of Capehart's survivors to a
mere $8,291.
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Subsequently, the United States government served notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention to become effective on May
15, 1966. 9 1
Shortly before the denunciation became effective, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) brought about an
inter-carrier arrangement which requested air carriers having
landing privileges in the United States to sign an agreement which
increased the limitation of liability of the signatory airlines to
$75,000 per passenger, regardless of negligence.9 2 However, this
increase was to apply only to flights in which the tickets provide
a "contact" with some place in the United States, either as a point
93
of origin, ultimate destination or intermediate stopping place.
No attempt was made to provide any insulation or protection for
manufacturers, the United States government or any of the other
94
potential defendants.
Thus, faced with the government's denunciation of the extremely low damage limits imposed upon the passenger public by
the Warsaw Convention, the air carriers agreed among themselves
to increase and limit their liability to a maximum of $75,000, applicable primarily to Americans.
The Montreal Agreement has hardly proved popular with the
passenger public of other countries since they ultimately have had
to pay for the greater awards to American citizens.9 5 Despite the
obvious preference for American passengers, economic pressures
arising from fear of total withdrawal by the United States from
the Warsaw Convention induced most carriers to sign the Agreement. On May 13, 1966, the Civil Aeronautics Board approved
this interim agreement. 9 6 On May 14, 1966, the United States
obsequiously withdrew its notice of denunciation of the Warsaw
Convention and surrendered to the power and self-interest of
IATA. 97
The Interim Agreement is not "interim" and is not a treaty.
91. See 44 CAB REP. 819-20 (1966); 9 M. WmTEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER552-53 (1968).
92. See 44 CAB REP. 819-20 (1966); 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966); KENNELLY,
supra note 3, at 111-13.
NATIONAL LAw

93. Montreal Interim Agreement, note 3, supra.

94. See generally id.
95. See Address by John J. Kennelly before the Royal Aeronautical Society,
Nov. 4, 1970, at London England [copy on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
96. C.A.B. Order No. E23680, 44 CAB REP. 819 (1966).
97. Dept. State Release No. 111, at 1, May 14, 1966.
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It is merely an agreement which binds only those carriers who
98
signed it. Any carrier may withdraw without any reason.
It is amazing that the Civil Aeronautics Board had the
temerity to "approve" this agreement, which attempts to bind not
only 200 million United States citizens but also the two billion citizens of more than two hundred nations throughout the world.

VI.

A

PROGNOSIS ON THE LAW RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL

The international airlines are currently working with the
State Department for United States adherence to the Guatemala
Protocol,"9 an amendment to the Warsaw Convention. An amazing facet of this proposed amendment is that airlines are to receive
insulation from all damages in excess of $100,000, even though
the airline is reckless or guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct.' 00
Proponents of the Guatemala Protocol including the State
Department seek to induce the Senate to approve the Protocol on
the grounds that United States citizens will receive an additional
$220,000 resulting in an aggregate sum of $320,000.11' However, it is important to note that more than $100,000 of such additional benefits will be the result of compulsory insurance coverage
for which all American passengers will indirectly pay. 102
No objective person can justify the immunization of international airlines from liability when aircraft manufacturers, noncommercial pilots and owners and the United States government
remain subject to unlimited liability. The Guatemala Protocol
hardly supplies a semblence of reform; the cure is worse than the
sickness.
98. See generally Montreal Interim Agreement, note 3, supra.
99. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929
as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955, done at
Guatemala City March 8, 1971 [reproduced in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 613

(1971)].
100. Id., art. VIII.
101. The Protocol limit is fixed at $100,000 in the 1971 draft of the document. Due to fluctuations in the value of gold, that limit is now equivalent to
$120,000. Additionally, United States citizens will have the benefit of a compensation fund which will provide up to $200,000 more to a passenger whose
damages exceed the $100,000 limit. See, Landry, Yes or No on the Guatemala
Protocol, 10 THE FORUM 727, 733-35 (1975).
102. Id. at 735-36.
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The world has been catapulted from the horse and buggy era
into an age of conventional jetliners, supersonic transports and
space travel. The laws applicable to aviation transportation
simply have not kept up with these rapid changes. The state of
the law is such that one author has devised a computer to determine which possible treaty applies to a given set of facts in the
almost endless number of trips which could be taken in international air travel. The program takes into account the hundreds
of sovereign cities and states, the rapidly developing new nations
of the world and the proliferation of subsidized international airlines. 103
Clearly such a state is unjustifiable in the law of aviation
travel. It has arisen because lawyers have attempted to engraft
upon an outmoded, unworkable and anachronistic treaty which no
longer should control the rights of more than two billion people.
The immediate implementation of completely new and dynamic concepts is urgently required to protect the interests of the
passenger public and the aircraft industry. Those who remain
rigid in their points of view seeking special treatment for their
particular interests should realize that changes are necessary to
promote the economic well-being of the entire aircraft industry
and just treatment for injured passengers and survivors of deceased passengers. Clearly something must be done to avoid application of fifteenth century tort law and a fifty-year-old treaty
to subsonic, supersonic, hypersonic or space travel.
Recognizably, these comments are somewhat controversial.
It is hoped, however, that they will illuminate a complex and often
misunderstood subject, and will contribute toward reducing polarization of views. Ultimately, perhaps, these remarks will result in
beneficial measures that are fair to all.
Some lawyers oppose any change. But lawyers opposing
meaningful reform in the law of international air travel are like
doctors opposing penicillin and dentists opposing fluoride. The
time will certainly arrive when regardless of nationality, passengers can quickly receive reasonable damages for loss incurred in
air travel.

103. See Note, Computer Application to Law-International Aviation Liability Analysis-Warsaw, Hague, Montreal Flight, 35 J. Am L. & CoM. 249

(1969).
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